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Introductory Remarks 
 
One focus of the ongoing accession negotiations of the EU with Turkey are the independence 
and impartiality of the judiciary. Since 2008, Professor Giegerich has visited Turkey several 
times as an independent expert of the European Commission to evaluate the independence and 
impartiality of the Turkish judiciary. He submitted four pertinent reports to the Commission 
which were transmitted to the Turkish Government as well as the Governments of the EU 
Member States. Additionally, in May of 2014, he took part in a Peer Review Mission on the 
High Council of Judges and Prosecutors. This report has meanwhile been made public by the 
Turkish Government and the European Commission. It is also made available on this website. 
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Disclaimer 
This peer review was conducted from 6 to 8 May 2014 by an independent expert in agreement 
between the European Commission and the Turkish authorities with the support of TAIEX, 
and followed by a series of exchange of comments and additional information, including 
during a meeting held in Brussels on 7 November 2014.  
The views expressed in this report are entirely those of the independent expert and do not 
represent the views neither of the European Commission nor of the Turkish government.  
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Executive Summary 
The process of judicial reform in Turkey has progressed far towards ensuring the 
implementation of common European standards of effectiveness, independence and 
impartiality. The most important element was the reform of the High Council of Judges 
and Public Prosecutors (HSYK) which was accomplished in 2010 but in certain respects 
did not go far enough. Before that reform could firmly take root the new legislation of 
February 2014 increased governmental influence on the HSYK and the Justice 
Academy. The Constitutional Court struck down most of the new provisions which had 
given the Minister of Justice in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK a 
high degree of control over the HSYK. The legislature has meanwhile dutifully executed 
the Constitutional Court decision. Some provisions, however, which have survived that 
Court’s scrutiny, still raise concerns from a European point of view. These provisions 
add several new items to the unfinished reform agenda of 2010. More importantly, 
further steps are needed to restore the credibility of the governing majority as regards 
their adherence to the principles of judicial independence and impartiality in all cases, 
including high-profile cases (that is to say cases which are considered as politically 
important). 
 
1. The Purpose of the Current Mission 
The purpose of the current mission was to study the effects of the Law No. 6524 on the 
Amendment of Certain Laws which was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 
15 February after heated debates, signed by the President of the Republic on 26 February and 
entered into force on 27 February 2014. The Law No. 6524 amends various laws, but my 
focus is the extent in which it has changed the Law No. 6087 on the High Council of Judges 
and Public Prosecutors (HSYK). The Law No. 6087 was enacted as part of the judicial reform 
of 2010 together with pertinent amendments to the Constitution. There were no constitutional 
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amendments accompanying the new Law No. 6524. That Law also changed the Law No. 4954 
on the Justice Academy.  
The Law No. 6524 increases the influence of the executive on both institutions. The HSYK is 
the keystone of the Turkish judicial architecture because it plays a crucial role in the 
promotion and transfer to other locations of, and disciplinary proceedings against judges and 
public prosecutors, including their removal from office.1 When the independence and 
impartiality of the HSYK is jeopardized, so is the independence and impartiality of the 
Turkish judiciary as a whole. The Justice Academy on the other hand is entrusted with the 
pre-service and in-service training of all the judges and public prosecutors. It shapes the 
current and future members of the judiciary. Independence and impartiality must be firmly 
rooted in their conscience if those values are to become an every-day reality. Whoever 
controls the Justice Academy exercises considerable influence on those who are to function as 
independent and impartial guardians of the law. The reform of the Justice Academy, which 
the Constitutional Court upheld,2 was not the subject of my mission. I therefore only note in 
passing that it increased the executive influence on the Academy This is important due to the 
fact that the General Assembly of the Justice Academy (in which senior staff of the Ministry 
of Justice and appointees of the Minister constitute a majority) elects one HSYK member.  
I will not only consider the immediate impact which Law No. 6524 has had on the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary, as represented by the HSYK, but also the 
long-term effects in this regard. This will require an assessment of the climate in which 
Turkish judges and public prosecutors currently have to work.  
In making my assessments, I am using the common European standards of independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary that are laid down in the documents listed in the annex to this 
Report. 
 
2. The Constitutional Court Decision of 10 April 2014 and the Reaction by the 
Legislature 
The Turkish Constitutional Court in its meeting of 10th April 2014 found the most problematic 
parts of Law No. 6524 to be unconstitutional. The reasoned judgment was published in the 
Official Gazette only on 14 May 2014, after the end of my current mission. It placed the ball 
in the legislature’s court which had to bring the Law No. 6524 in line with the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court decision in this case (as in all other cases) did not have retroactive 
effect where it struck down provisions of the Law. Thus, the consequences which those 
provisions had caused in the meantime remained unaffected. However, the Minister of Justice 
in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK had exercised only some of the 
additional powers which the Law No. 6524 had granted to him in violation of the 
Constitution. With regard to certain unconstitutional provisions, the Constitutional Court 
decision gave the legislature three months’ time from the date of publication of the reasoned 
opinion (14 May 2014) to repair the defects before the annulment became effective. This was 
in order to prevent the emergence of a legal void because the annulment of a provision 
amending an existing law does not restore the previous legal situation because of the lack of 
retroactive effect of the annulment decision. Finally, with regard to some provisions, the 
Constitutional Court ordered a stay of execution, thus preventing accomplished facts. 
                                                 
1 See my Report of 4 February 2013, para. 1.1. (available at http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Report04022013_edited.pdf). 
2 See below para. 2. on the decision of the Constitutional Court. 
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On 28 June 2014, the Law No. 6545 entered into force. It amended the Law No. 6087 on the 
HSYK in order to repair the violations of the Constitution as had been established by the 
Constitutional Court in the aforementioned decision. The Law No. 6545 restored the legal 
situation before the entry into force of the Law No. 6524 to the extent in which the 
Constitutional Court had found that law to be unconstitutional. 
 
3. The Preparation of the Current Report 
The current mission took place at a time of legal uncertainty after the Constitutional Court 
decision of 10 April 2014 but before the reasoned judgment had been published on 14 May 
2014. In accordance with the usual procedure, the first version of my report was submitted to 
the European Commission on 3 June 2014 and by them transferred to the Turkish authorities 
for their comments. Taking into account, but not always following those comments which I 
had received on 19 July 2014, I produced a revised version of my report on 30 July 2014. As 
an exception to the usual practice of peer reviews, the Turkish authorities thereupon suggested 
a meeting in Brussels to discuss my report and their comments, in particular those which I had 
not accepted. That meeting took place on 7 November 2011. Two days earlier, I had received 
a new set of comments from the Turkish authorities which constituted the basis for our 
discussions in Brussels. Only on 6 November 2014 did I receive an English translation of the 
relevant provisions of the Law No. 6545. In the Brussels meeting, some misunderstandings 
could be cleared up. On some other issues, differences of opinion remained. 
 
4. Sequence of Events from December 2013 until the Enactment of Law No. 6524 in 
February 2014 
Before outlining the sequence of events between December 2013 and the adoption of the Law 
No. 6524 in February 2014, I underline that for me, the decisive question is this: What 
impression was that course of action by the government likely to make on external observers 
of the rule of law in Turkey and, more importantly, on the judges and public prosecutors and 
on the general public in Turkey concerning the effective guarantee of the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary? The effects of such profound legislative changes on the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary cannot be properly evaluated without 
considering the circumstances under which they were adopted. These circumstances include 
public statements from the political branches that they were determined to combat an alleged 
anti-government conspiracy (“coup attempt”) within the judiciary.3  
As far as the impression made on external observers is concerned, suffice it to quote the 
European Commission: “… the government’s response to allegations of corruption targeting 
high-level personalities, including members of the government and their families, raised 
serious concerns over the independence of judiciary and the rule of law. This response 
consisted in particular in amendments to the Law on the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors and subsequent numerous reassignments and dismissals of judges and 
prosecutors, as well as reassignments, dismissals, or even detention, of a large number of 
police officers. This raised serious concerns with regard to the operational capabilities of the 
judiciary and the police and cast serious doubts on their ability to conduct the investigations 
into corruption allegations in a non-discriminatory, transparent and impartial manner.”4 
                                                 
3 See below para. 4.1. and 5.1. 
4 Summary of findings of the 2014 Progress Report on Turkey, Annex to COM(2014)700 final of 8 October 
2014 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-turkey-progress-
report_en.pdf [last accessed on 29 November 2014]), p. 3. 
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4.1. The December Events and the Government's Response 
In December 2013, prosecutors initiated proceedings against cabinet members and/or their 
close relatives for suspicion of corruption. Under Turkish law, prosecutors are obliged to 
investigate in a neutral manner, collecting evidence for and against potential suspects, 
whenever they consider that there are sufficient indications that a crime was committed.  
The European Commission’s Turkey Progress Report summarized this sequence of events:  
“For most of the year, attention was drawn to the 17 and 25 December 2013 corruption 
allegations targeting the Prime Minister, four ministers, their relatives, the head of the 
biggest public bank, public officials and businessmen. Ten out of twenty-five 
ministers were replaced in a Cabinet reshuffle on 25 December. There was a 
significant delay in submitting requests to parliament to lift the immunity of four 
former ministers implicated in corruption allegations.  
In response to the allegations of corruption, the government alleged that there had 
been an attempted judicial coup by a ‘parallel structure’ within the state, controlled by 
the Gülen Movement. Prosecutors and police officers in charge of the original 
investigations of 17 and 25 December were removed from their posts. A significant 
number of reassignments and dismissals in the police, civil service and the judiciary 
followed, accompanied by legal measures in the judiciary. … 
As part of that response, key legislation, including on the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors and on the internet, was drafted and adopted in haste and without 
consultations. … 
On 19 December, the government amended the regulation on judicial police to require 
law enforcement officers, when acting upon instructions of prosecutors, to notify their 
police hierarchy about any criminal notices or complaints. On 25 December, police did 
not follow instructions from prosecutors to detain suspects as part of two 
investigations into alleged corruption. The HSYK issued a statement on 26 December 
criticising this amendment as being contrary to judicial independence. On 27 
December, the Council of State suspended implementation of the amendment 
considering it to be contrary to the Code on Criminal Procedures. The Minister of 
Justice, in his capacity as President of the HSYK, decided on 30 December that any 
HSYK public statement should receive his prior approval.”5 
 
In the aforementioned Cabinet overhaul of 25 December 2013, the Minister of Justice was 
also replaced. I was explained that he resigned in order to be able to run as a candidate in the 
mayoral election in his home town (which he eventually did without success). It needs to be 
underlined that he was not at all affected by the investigations into alleged corruption and not 
suspected of any wrongdoing.  
 
4.2. Transfer of Location of Public Prosecutors 
The newly-appointed Minister of Justice automatically became the ex officio President of the 
HSYK.6 He selected a new Undersecretary who thereby automatically became an ex officio 
Member of the First Chamber of the HSYK.7 In the first session of the Plenary of the HSYK 
                                                 
5 Turkey 2014 Progress Report of 8 October 2014, SWD(2014)307 final, p. 9, 45 (see above note 4). 
6 It was him who decided on 30 December that any HSYK public statement should receive his prior approval. 
7 I note that by 8 May 2014, more than sixty judges and prosecutors who had previously worked in the Ministry 
of Justice had been transferred to the courts and replaced by new personnel. 
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on 15 January 2014 which he presided, the Minister proposed (and the majority agreed to) an 
addition to the agenda concerning changes to the composition of the three Chambers.8 The 
reason given by the Minister was that the work of the Chambers should be made more 
efficient. The Plenary thereupon re-evaluated each member one by one and decided whether 
to leave him or her in the current position or transfer him or her to another Chamber. As a 
result, two members of the First Chamber9 were exchanged, one with a member of the Second 
Chamber and the other one with a member of the Third Chamber. On the following day, the 
newly-composed First Chamber issued a decree by a majority of six (including the three new 
members) to one. By that decree which was effective immediately the First Chamber 
transferred to other locations prosecutors who were considered responsible for the 
investigations against the cabinet members and/or their family members. The reason given 
was that there had been irregularities in those investigations and that the timing indicated a 
coordinated attack on the Government by “foreign circles” or a “parallel structure.”10 The 
President of the First Chamber explained to me in the official meeting I had with that 
Chamber in which all the members of the First Chamber were present that the prosecutors 
involved in the investigations were not transferred, out of respect for their independence. 
Rather, their superiors – the Chief Public Prosecutors – were transferred because they had not 
properly controlled their subordinates. The new Chief Public Prosecutors then decided to give 
other assignments to the prosecutors involved. This course of events prompts me first of all to 
repeat a recommendation I made in my Report of 4 February 2013,11 always in view of its 
likely influence on the public perception as to the effective implementation of the 
independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. 
I recommend that the High Council take seriously the responsibility to protect the 
credibility of the judicial system and maintain public confidence in its orderly 
functioning in terms of independence and impartiality, especially in high-profile cases. It 
should immediately explain its decisions in those cases to the public. 
 
These events occurred before the entry into force of the Law No. 6524. Pursuant to the Law 
No. 6087 on the HSYK in the version which was then applicable, the disciplinary power over 
judges and prosecutors was actually vested in the Second and Third Chambers. The Third 
Chamber was responsible for investigations with the help of the Inspection Board, subject to 
the approval of the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK,12 and the 
Second Chamber was responsible for deciding on whether the results of those investigations 
warranted disciplinary action or even prosecution. But the majority of the First Chamber 
(which is responsible for routine transfer decisions) believed that there was no time to follow 
that regular procedure and that the transfers had to be made immediately to avoid “irreparable 
damage” – to the judiciary. Some members of the HSYK believed that this was interference 
by the First Chamber in the responsibility of the other Chambers.  
The course of action taken by the First Chamber risks being perceived by judges and public 
prosecutors in Turkey as an indication that, if they are involved in high-profile cases, they are 
                                                 
8 The dissenters argued that such a change of composition of the Chambers was illegal, while the majority 
considered it to be covered by the general power of the Plenary under Art. 8 (2) of Law No. 6087 in the interest 
of ensuring the smooth functioning of the HSYK. 
9 The First Chamber is considered as the most important Chamber since it exercises the appointment and transfer 
power affecting the vast majority of judges and public prosecutors and their families. 
10 See below para. 5.1. 
11 See para. 2.5.3.4. of that Report (available at http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Report04022013_edited.pdf). 
12 See below para. 5.5.1. 
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subject to immediate transfer of location, whenever the majority of the First Chamber is 
dissatisfied with their performance, irrespective of the reason for such dissatisfaction and 
irrespective of whether they committed any disciplinary offence. This raises concerns because 
it is likely to destroy much of the progress which had been made in creating a mentality of 
independence in the members of the judiciary. The independence of the judiciary is not 
adequately guaranteed and the rule of law not adequately enforced, unless the same standards 
are adhered to in both routine and high-profile cases. 
The events described confirm that the routine transfer power of the First Chamber must be 
more strictly regulated. While that power is in the large majority of cases undoubtedly used 
properly and in accordance with the requests of the judges and public prosecutors concerned, 
it can be abused as an instrument of intimidation striking at the heart of prosecutorial and 
judicial independence and impartiality. The power of routine transfer of location must not 
become the ‘Achilles heel’ of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and this 
must be put beyond doubt for all the immediate stakeholders (i.e. judges and public 
prosecutors) as well as the general public.  
Moreover, it has become obvious that the independence and impartiality of the chief public 
prosecutors is the cornerstone of an independent and impartial judiciary. Additional 
safeguards are required to prevent interferences in the judicial process via the chief public 
prosecutors. The events also confirm that transfer decisions must be made subject to judicial 
review. This requires a constitutional amendment, but the aforementioned events have proven 
that these steps are indispensable to safeguard the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary in Turkey both in fact and in appearance. It has become necessary to demonstrate to 
all the immediate stakeholders in the judiciary as well as the general public that the chief 
public prosecutors cannot be easily removed for reasons which are incompatible with the 
fundamental values of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. I therefore underline 
and extend the recommendations I made in my previous report.13 
I recommend that for the sake of safeguarding their independence in law and practice 
both judges and public prosecutors (including chief public prosecutors) be guaranteed 
security of tenure and location after a period of time not exceeding ten years. It must be 
ensured that the High Council can only remove or relocate those tenured judges or 
public prosecutors against their will for disciplinary reasons on a clearly formulated 
statutory basis and subject to judicial review. The separation of powers between the 
Chambers of the HSYK according to which routine transfer decisions are made by the 
First Chamber and the disciplinary power is shared by the Second and Third Chambers 
must be strictly observed.  
That guarantee of security of location does not extend to the judges and public 
prosecutors who work in the Ministry of Justice at the discretion of the Minister. 
Neither does it extend to the rapporteur judges of the high courts, the Constitutional 
Court and the HSYK whose work at their respective institution should be subject to the 
continuous confidence of that institution’s General Assembly. But since the speedy and 
effective exercise of the judicial functions by the high courts, the Constitutional Court 
and the HSYK depends on the support of the rapporteur judges, it must be ensured that 
no authority outside the respective judicial body with which they are affiliated interferes 
with their work, unless permission is given by the General Assembly of the respective 
judicial body. 
                                                 
13 See my Report of 4 February 2013, para. 2.5.1. and para. 3 (available at http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Report04022013_edited.pdf). 
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I further recommend that all HSYK decisions imposing a burden on chief public 
prosecutors, such as their transfer to another location against their will or other 
burdensome decisions taken against them, be made subject to the most exacting 
substantive and procedural standards. They should be entrusted to the Plenary of the 
HSYK and require a qualified majority. 
I further recommend that the judicial review should be extended to all the High Council 
decisions which potentially interfere with the independence or impartiality or individual 
rights of judges and public prosecutors. This concerns in particular the transfer 
decisions of the First Chamber.14 I recommend that the necessary constitutional 
amendment be enacted to enable such judicial review. 
 
At the additional meeting I had with representatives of the Turkish authorities in Brussels on 7 
November 2014, we intensively discussed the above recommendations. I realize the 
difficulties which a guarantee of location would cause to the current Turkish system of regular 
transfers of location from less attractive to more attractive work places and vice versa. But I 
continue to believe that reform is both necessary and possible. I also continue to believe that 
in Turkey, the chief public prosecutors have great influence on the administration of justice at 
their courthouses so that whoever controls them controls the administration of justice to a 
considerable extent. This is why the transfer of location of chief public prosecutors against 
their will and other burdensome decisions (such as disciplinary measures) pose a particular 
problem. 
At that 7 November meeting, we also intensively discussed the issue of judicial review of all 
HSYK decisions. I explained my opinion in detail in my Reports of 2011 and 2013. I there 
particularly argued that the existing internal review mechanism is good, but not good enough. 
After it has been unsuccessfully exhausted, an external review by the courts must be made 
available.15 The problematic transfer of location decisions of the First Chamber have 
reinforced my conviction. My interlocutors pointed out that the persons transferred had made 
no use of the internal objection procedure. I cannot tell why they did not, but they might well 
have found a judicial remedy more promising. 
In view of discussions at that Brussels meeting, I add a clarification concerning judges and 
public prosecutors who work in the Ministry of Justice or as rapporteur judges for the high 
courts, the Constitutional Court and the HSYK. While those who have voluntarily opted for a 
transfer to the Ministry have become part of the executive branch of government, the 
rapporteur judges remain part of the independent and impartial judiciary. They perform 
important judicial functions in support of their respective court or the HSYK that all depend 
on such support in order to function effectively. The independence and impartiality of the 
respective judicial body must therefore also cover the rapporteur judges. 
 
4.3. The Ex Officio Chairmanship of the Minister of Justice and Membership of the 
Undersecretary in the HSYK 
The events described moreover indicate that vesting the presidency of the HSYK in the 
Minister of Justice and making the Undersecretary an ex officio member of the First Chamber 
is not conducive to preserving the independence and impartiality of the Turkish judiciary, 
                                                 
14 See below para. 5.5.6. 
15 See my Report of 1 August 2011, para. 3.2.6. (available at http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Report01082011_edited.pdf) and my Report of 4 February 2013, para. 3 (available at 
http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Report04022013_edited.pdf). 
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both in fact and in appearance to the immediate stakeholders in the judiciary and the general 
public. The specific environment in which the Turkish judiciary operates does apparently not 
permit arrangements which can indeed be found in some other European countries. Contrary 
to my previous assumption it has now become clear that the membership of the two leading 
representatives of the Ministry of Justice in the High Council is not only symbolic. Rather, the 
two can exercise decisive influence on the operations of the HSYK and will do so if they 
consider it as necessary. In my 2011 Report I agreed with the Venice Commission that 
proposed to make the actual functioning of the HSYK the real test in respect of the 
governmental presence.16 The Venice Commission referred to the danger that the Minister and 
the Undersecretary might abuse their position for the purpose of exerting undue pressure and 
influence on the functioning of the High Council.  
In view of the events in January 2014 which clearly demonstrated the influence which the 
Minister of Justice in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK has on the High 
Council,17 I partly repeat and partly revise my previous recommendations. From my present 
standpoint, both the Minister of Justice and the Undersecretary should ultimately be removed 
from the HSYK. This would send a strong signal to the judiciary and the general public that 
the political branches are making serious efforts at strengthening the independence of the 
judiciary and restoring credibility. It would also counteract the erroneous conception that 
because the HSYK is presided over by the Minister who is politically responsible to the 
TGNA, the Minister should control the High Council so as to make that political 
responsibility effective.18 This would mean no less than subjecting the HSYK to the control of 
the respective parliamentary majority which is incompatible with European standards of 
judicial independence. 
The Undersecretary should be immediately removed from the HSYK. His ex officio full 
voting membership in the First Chamber is problematic because that Chamber is considered 
as the most important one since it exercises the appointment and transfer power affecting the 
vast majority of judges and public prosecutors and their families. Whatever flow of 
information may be necessary between the First Chamber and the Ministry can be guaranteed 
in other ways. For instance, one could admit an observer from the Ministry to attend the 
meetings with the right to speak but not to vote. 
It would be most conducive to the independence of the judiciary both in fact and in 
appearance if the ex officio HSYK membership of both the Minister and the Undersecretary 
were terminated. As a first step in that direction, one could imagine the removal of the 
Undersecretary and the reduction of the Minister’s position to a purely symbolic presidency. 
All the substantive functions of the Minister would henceforth be exercised by the Deputy 
President and the Minister would simply chair the meetings of the Plenary (except those on 
disciplinary matters) without any influence on the agenda and without the right to vote. 
Ultimately, the symbolic Presidency of the HSYK could be transferred for instance to a high-
ranking personality that credibly embodies judicial independence. I realize that the 
implementation of these recommendations requires constitutional amendment. 
I recommend that the current form of the ex officio chairmanship of the Minister of 
Justice and the ex officio membership of the Undersecretary in the HSYK be terminated 
in the medium term. As a first step, the Undersecretary should be removed from the 
HSYK and the Minister’s position be reduced to a purely symbolic presidency, all his 
                                                 
16 See my Report of 1 August 2011, para. 2.3.3. (available at http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Report01082011_edited.pdf). 
17 See above para. 4.2. 
18 This erroneous conception was presented to me during my visit as one argument in support of the Law No. 
6524 (see para. 5.1.). 
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substantive functions being exercised by the Deputy President. Ultimately, the symbolic 
Presidency of the HSYK could be transferred for instance to a high-ranking personality 
that credibly embodies judicial independence. 
 
4.4. Ensuring the Public Accountability of the HSYK 
On the other hand, I reconfirm what I wrote in my Report of 14 April 2009: “[A] 
constitutional system cannot function properly unless all the three branches of government 
loyally cooperate with each other. Irrespective of the great importance of preserving the 
independence of the judiciary, the third branch of government must not forget that after all it 
is a branch of government and cannot claim total independence from the other branches of 
that same democratically accountable government.”19 Rather, there should be a well-balanced 
system of checks and balances between all the branches of government that are all ultimately 
accountable to the people. However, that system must be designed in a way which maintains 
the independence and impartiality of the judiciary both in fact and in appearance. Thus, the 
HSYK should not be, nor be perceived as, the representation of the professional interests of 
the judges and public prosecutors. Rather, it must credibly function as a body of professional 
self-administration serving the public interest in an independent, impartial and effective 
judiciary. Its operations must also take place under the watchful eyes of the other branches of 
government, the media and the public to whom the HSYK is ultimately accountable.  
The presence of four members from outside the judiciary who are appointed by the President 
of the Republic already contributes to ensuring that the HSYK is functioning in the public 
interest and not only in the self-interest of the members of the judiciary. Apart from that, the 
HSYK must work hard for the confidence of the public by adhering to objective decisions-
making standards which are pre-published, transparent decision-making processes, well-
reasoned decisions which are subject to judicial review, the publication of anonymized 
versions of all important decisions as well as an active information policy. I realize that since 
the reform of 2010, the HSYK has made considerable progress in these regards. But the 
events since January 2014 have unfortunately demonstrated that in high-profile cases (that is 
cases which are considered as politically important) the HSYK is ready to use special 
standards that are not compatible with the principles of independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary.  
Concerning an improved active information policy of the HSYK, this could comprise regular 
(for instance bi-annual) reports which are sent to both the Ministry of Justice and the TGNA 
and published on the HSYK’s website. The Deputy President of the HSYK should participate 
in a public question and answer session of the Justice Committee of the TGNA to explain 
those reports. Representatives of the Ministry of Justice should also attend that session and be 
permitted to raise questions. This reporting procedure should be regulated by law. 
Moreover, as I wrote in my Report of 4 February 2013,20 the High Council needs to appoint 
one of its members as the official spokesperson and liaison with the media. This should be 
done as soon as possible. The spokesperson should be responsible for issuing press releases 
on all important decisions made by the High Council, in particular those pertaining to high-
profile cases; those press releases should also be published on the website of the High 
Council. The spokesperson should also be available for interviews. He or she should be given 
professional assistance by someone with media experience, such as a journalist to be 
employed by the High Council. This media expert would also be responsible for constantly 
                                                 
19 Para. 1.4.3. (available at http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Report14042009_edited.pdf). 
20 Para. 2.1. 
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monitoring the media coverage of the judiciary and alert the High Council to instances calling 
for an official reaction to counteract negative publicity.  
As a matter of course, the information policy of judicial institutions, including the HSYK, is 
subject to confidentiality requirements as far as ongoing investigations etc. are concerned. On 
the other hand, the judicial branch of government needs to open up to public (media) scrutiny 
more than before. Otherwise, it will be difficult for it to create and maintain public 
confidence. 
I recommend that the HSYK create public confidence in their function as a body of 
professional self-administration that serves the public interest in an independent, 
impartial and effective judiciary. For that purpose it should adhere to objective 
decisions-making standards which are pre-published, use transparent decision-making 
processes, issue well-reasoned decisions which are subject to judicial review, publish 
anonymized versions of all important decisions as well as engage in an active 
information policy vis-à-vis the other branches of government (by making and defending 
regular reports) and the general public (via the media). Most importantly, the HSYK 
should use the ordinary decision-making standards also in high-profile cases, that is to 
say cases which are considered as politically important.  
 
4.5. The Importance of the Judicial Police for Effective, Independent and Impartial 
Prosecutions 
The aforementioned investigations into alleged corruption induced the Government to impose 
reporting requirements on members of the judicial police, which the HSYK characterized as 
interference in the independence of the prosecution.21 The Government have also transferred 
hundreds of police officers who are subordinates of the Ministry of the Interior. However, the 
prosecutors depend on the assistance of the police for their investigations. The judicial 
independence of the prosecutors can be undermined, if their indispensable instruments – the 
judicial police – are subject to governmental interference (either in the form of direct orders or 
in the form of reprisals) to the effect that certain investigations are not conducted 
independently and solely in the interests of justice or not conducted at all. The events since 
December 2013 raise concerns that the independence of the judicial police is not sufficiently 
guaranteed in practice. 
I recommend that the judicial police be brought under the cover of the independence of 
the judiciary in the same way as the public prosecutors in order to make the 
independence of the prosecution effective. The independence of the judicial police must 
be guaranteed both in law and in practice. Where police officers exercise judicial as well 
as other functions, it must be ensured that their integration in the police hierarchy with 
regard to those other functions does not jeopardize their independence with regard to 
their judicial functions. 
 
5. The Enactment of Law No. 6524 
5.1. Background of the Enactment 
According to the explanation I was given in the Ministry of Justice, the original legislative 
proposal was prepared in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). It was not 
introduced by the Government but by AKP deputies. The Ministry became involved only 
                                                 
21 See above para. 4.1. 
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when the legislative proposal was debated in the Justice Committee of the TGNA. There it 
recommended amendments. However, there is no trace of a thorough review regarding the 
compatibility of the legislative proposal with European standards either in the TGNA or in the 
Ministry. The legislative process which produced Law No. 6524 obviously had no built-in 
safety valve to prevent the adoption of legislation contradicting Turkey’s long-term 
commitments to European standards. While draft laws prepared by the Government for the 
purpose of harmonising Turkish law with EU law are routinely screened for their 
compatibility with EU law,22 that screening does not occur more generally beyond the bills 
specifically geared towards the EU acquis, and there is no such procedure for legislative 
proposals originating in the TGNA. 
I recommend that a routine procedure be established to thoroughly screen all draft laws 
and legislative proposals, irrespective of where they originate, including draft 
constitutional amendments, as to their compatibility with European (EU and European 
Convention on Human Rights) standards, in particular in the area of judicial 
independence and impartiality as well as human rights. Such a screening procedure 
should be performed under the joint responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly and concluded by a report that is made public before 
the final vote in the Assembly. This would prevent overhasty legislation and help Turkey 
to ensure that it always faithfully adheres to its legal and political commitments as a 
candidate country for EU membership and party to the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  
 
The Law No. 6524 was adopted by the TGNA within little more than a month. The primary 
stakeholders – the HSYK and the Justice Academy – were not officially involved. However, 
some HSYK members were contacted unofficially. As a matter of fact, the plenary of the 
HSYK had published an opinion on the Draft Constitution in 201323 where it proposed 
additional reform steps with regard to the judiciary. Those proposals went in the opposite 
direction from the legislative proposal which became Law No. 6524.  
When I asked why the new Law was considered not only as necessary but seemingly even as 
extremely urgent, I was given the following reasons by several of my interlocutors during the 
official meetings that had been organized together with the Ministry of Justice. I was not 
given any other explanation for the enactment of the Law No. 6524, even though I specifically 
asked for it in each and every session I had during my visit. I repeat those reasons here 
without taking any position as to whether or not they are factually correct: the HSYK had had 
(unspecified) “operational problems”; it had not sufficiently explained its decisions; it had 
elected too many young judges as members of the High Courts, thus blocking the career 
perspectives of others for too long; it had packed the High Courts with members of “foreign 
circles”; the majority of the HSYK themselves belonged to those “foreign circles”; the HSYK 
should have intervened to stop abusive investigations against the Government; the HSYK had 
not properly controlled the Inspection Board; since the Minister of Justice was responsible to 
the TGNA also with regard to his position as President of the HSYK, he had to be given 
power over the HSYK to match his political responsibility.  
In my eyes, none of those reasons convincingly justifies the unusually quick adoption of the 
far-reaching Law No. 6524. Specific “operational problems” of the HSYK should have been 
                                                 
22 The new Prime Minister Davutoğlu issued a Circular 2014/16 (published in the Official Gazette No. 29130 of 
25 September 2014) to this effect.  
23 Work on the new Constitution has become stalled because of disagreements between the Government and the 
opposition. 
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addressed by specific amendments to the law, such as a requirement to give sufficient reasons 
for decisions, to lay down and publish specific objective criteria for its decisions or to better 
explain the Council’s policies to the public. To the extent in which the reasons I was given 
imply the allegation of possible illegal behaviour by members of the HSYK, disciplinary 
proceedings could have been initiated against them in accordance with the law. This was not 
done.  
In a written comment to the above paragraph of my Report of 30 July 2014, the Turkish 
Ministry of Justice stated that they did not understand what the term “foreign circles” referred 
to. I took that issue up at the meeting in Brussels on 7 November 2014 and explained that the 
term was used interchangeably with “parallel structure” in numerous public statements by 
high-level officials to justify their course of action since December 2013 and that it referred to 
the Gülen Movement. My Turkish counterparts immediately stated that they could not talk 
about the Gülen Movement. During my visit to Turkey in May, several of my interlocutors 
had told me that it was not illegal in Turkey to belong to that movement. Also the 
identification of Gülenists was usually not based on objective evidence but on the subjective 
beliefs of others concerning a person’s affiliation. 
 
5.2. Mitigation of the Original Legislative Proposal during the Legislative Process 
The original legislative proposal which would have given the Minister in his capacity as the 
ex officio President of the HSYK a high degree of control over the HSYK was mitigated 
during the legislative process in the TGNA.24 The President of the Republic, whose signature 
was needed for the entry into force of the law, made pertinent recommendations, and the 
version adopted by the Judicial Committee of the TGNA was improved. Further changes were 
made by the Plenary. Accordingly, the Law No. 6524 as enacted interferes less deeply with 
the independence of the judiciary than had originally been planned. However, the Law No. 
6524, instead of completing the reform of the HSYK in those areas where issues of judicial 
independence and impartiality have remained,25 dismantles previous accomplishments which 
were just about to take root. 
 
5.3. The Main Changes to the HSYK by the Law No. 6524 as Enacted26 
One of the most important changes brought about by the reform of 2010 was to transfer the 
responsibility for the Inspection Board from the Ministry of Justice to the HSYK. The Plenary 
of the HSYK was then put in charge of the appointment of the President and Vice Presidents 
of the Inspection Board. Law No. 6524 re-transferred that power to the Minister of Justice in 
his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK. Moreover, the new Law provided that 
the Inspection Board perform their duties on behalf of the Council, but under the supervision 
of the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK. It was also stated that 
the President of the Inspection Board was responsible to the Minister in his capacity as the ex 
officio President of the HSYK. The Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the 
HSYK was furthermore given the power to impose duties on the President of the Inspection 
Board27 (a power previously held by the relevant President of Chamber) and on the Inspection 
Board (a power previously held by the Plenary).28 The appointment of the inspectors 
                                                 
24 Examples are given below in the footnotes of para. 5.3.  
25 See my previous Reports of 1 August 2011 and 4 February 2013. 
26 See para. 5.4. on the parts of the Law No. 6524 which were struck down by the Constitutional Court. 
27 Art. 16 (1) lit. e of the Law No. 6087, as amended by the Law No. 6524. 
28 Art. 14 (4) lit. c of the Law No. 6087, as amended by the Law No. 6524. 
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remained vested in the Plenary, but their choice was limited to two candidates for each vacant 
position proposed by the First Chamber.29  
The influence of the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK was 
increased in another respect, namely the conduct of inspections, examinations and 
investigations against judges and prosecutors. Previously, Ministerial approval for those 
measures was needed in the sense that examinations and investigations could not be 
undertaken by the Third Chamber alone. Now, the Third Chamber needs the approval of the 
Minister even if it decides not to launch an examination or investigation. In other words, the 
Minister can now both prevent the Third Chamber from and compel it to ordering such an 
examination or investigation. 
The Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK was also given the 
authority to determine in what Chamber the members would serve – an authority previously 
vested in the Plenary.30 The power of the Plenary to elect the Chamber Presidents was 
restricted to the selection of one of two candidates to be proposed by each Chamber.31 The 
composition of the Chambers was, however, left unchanged.32 The power of appointing the 
Secretary-General of the HSYK has remained with the Minister in his capacity as the ex 
officio President of the HSYK and his choice continues to be limited to three candidates 
elected by the Plenary (in his absence33). But the election system was changed to the “one 
man, one vote” system in the first round,34 whereas in the second round (which takes place if 
the quorum of twelve votes35 is not reached in the first round) the three candidates with the 
highest vote will become the candidates. 
While under the previous law, the Plenary appointed the Deputy Secretaries-General that 
power was given to the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK by 
Law No. 6524. He also obtained the power to intervene in the division of labour among the 
Deputies by the Secretary-General which was made subject to Ministerial approval. The 
Minister can now determine the meeting days of the Plenary (which had previously been 
determined by the Plenary) and can also set the agenda of the Plenary without asking for the 
opinion of the Secretary-General.36  
The HSYK depend on rapporteur judges for the timely execution of their tasks. Previously, 
those rapporteur judges were appointed by the Plenary. Under the Law No. 6524, the choice 
of the Plenary was limited to two candidates for each vacant position proposed by the First 
Chamber.37 Whereas the other HSYK personnel were previously appointed by the Deputy 
Council President38 upon the motion of the Secretary-General, all the appointments are now 
                                                 
29 Under the original legislative proposal, the two candidates were to be proposed by the Minister in his capacity 
as the ex officio President of the HSYK. 
30 This power had not been exercised before the Constitutional Court declared it to be unconstitutional. 
31 Under the original legislative proposal, the two candidates were to be proposed by the Minister. Also, the 
Undersecretary could be elected as President of the First Chamber. 
32 According to the original legislative proposal, the First and Second Chambers should have only five members 
each, and the Third Chamber eleven. 
33 The rule that the Minister cannot participate in the meeting nominating and electing the candidates for 
Secretary-General was added by Law No. 6524. 
34 Previously, each member had had three votes. 
35 Under the previous law, the quorum had been fifteen. 
36 Under the original legislative proposal, only the Minister could allow discussion of issues outside the agenda 
items. Law No. 6524 has reinstated the right of each HSYK member to request agenda changes, but only in 
written form and one day before the meeting day at the latest. Such a request is decided by the Plenary (as 
before). 
37 Under the original legislative proposal, the two candidates were to be proposed by the Minister. 
38 The Deputy Council President is elected by the Plenary from among the Presidents of Chambers. 
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made by the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK. This revokes the 
autonomy regarding personnel which the HSYK only obtained in 2010. 
With regard to the election of HSYK members, the new law reintroduced the “one man, one 
vote system” with regard to those who are elected by the Court of Cassation, the Council of 
State and the Justice Academy. Each member of the general assemblies of those institutions 
now has only one vote (instead of as many votes as members are to be elected by the 
respective institution). With regard to the election of HSYK members by the judges and 
prosecutors and the administrative judges and prosecutors, Law No. 6524 retained the 
previous system which gives each voter as many votes as members and substitute members 
are to be elected by their group.  
The Law No. 6524 also increased the powers of the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio 
President of the HSYK at the expense of the HSYK Plenary with regard to disciplinary 
investigations against HSYK members.39 
As a matter of particular concern, the Law No. 6524 added the Provisional Art. 4 to the Law 
No. 6087. According to this provision, the entire personnel of the HSYK (including the 
Secretary-General, Deputy Secretaries-General, President and Deputy Presidents of the 
Inspection Board, all the inspectors, rapporteur judges and administrative staff) was 
automatically dismissed with the entry into force of the Law.40 New personnel were to be 
appointed or elected within ten days. The dismissed staff members were to be reassigned to 
new posts, taking their acquired rights into consideration. With the entry into force of the 
Law, also all the circulars of the HSYK were automatically revoked. All my interlocutors 
agreed that the dismissal of hundreds of judicial and administrative personnel by an act of the 
legislature without consideration of the individual cases was highly unusual. Provisional Art. 
4 amounts to an annihilation of the entire record of the post-2010 HSYK. It can only be 
perceived as a warning to the HSYK – both the members and their staff – as well as to the 
entire judiciary, represented by the HSYK, that any action considered as a judicial 
interference by the authorities is unwelcome and will have consequences, including dismissal 
from the current position.  
The new appointment powers of the Minister and/or the Plenary of the HSYK were 
immediately used41 before the Constitutional Court could order the stay of execution. The 
previous President of the Inspection Board was reappointed and two new Deputy Presidents 
appointed. 57 of the previous chief inspectors and inspectors were reappointed, while 80 
previous members of the Inspection Board were transferred.42 Of the previous 47 rapporteur 
judges, 18 were retained and 29 transferred. Of the previous 270 administrative staff 
members, 228 were retained, 195 of them on a temporary basis.43 As a matter of fact, none of 
those staff members was removed from the judiciary or public service, but 80 of 137 
inspectors and 29 of 47 rapporteur judges were removed from the HSYK. Only with regard to 
the administrative staff, the majority of the previous staff members was rehired. The question 
whether the decision-making process on which members of the previous personnel to rehire 
was transparent and objective criteria were used was not clearly answered. Some of the 
previous staff members are currently using various legal remedies against their dismissal.  
                                                 
39 Under the original legislative proposal, the Minister would have participated in the meetings of the Plenary on 
disciplinary matters. 
40 Under the original legislative proposal, the duties of the Deputy President of the HYSK and the Presidents of 
Chambers would also have been terminated. 
41 The Law entered into force on 27 February and the first appointments were made on 28 February. 
42 The appointment of the new inspectors was done by the Plenary of the HSYK even before the reasons for the 
Constitutional Court decision were published. 
43 These figures were mentioned to me on 7 May 2014. 
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In their written comments, the Ministry of Justice downplays the seriousness of the legislative 
interference in the operation of the HSYK by Provisional Art. 4 because ultimately so many 
staff members were reappointed. However, the dismissal of the entire personnel of the HSYK 
effectively shut down this judicial body for a certain – albeit short – period of time. More 
importantly, the fact that the personnel of the HSYK – the keystone of the Turkish judicial 
architecture – is dismissed by legislative fiat and then compelled to apply for reappointment 
in a process under the control of the Minister of Justice in his capacity as the ex officio 
President of the HSYK sends a clear message to the entire judiciary who is really in charge. 
In their written comments, the Ministry of Justice also states that there was no reason to claim 
that the transfer of the appointment power with regard to the administrative personnel of the 
HSYK from the Deputy Council President to the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio 
President of the HSYK derogated from the High Council’s autonomy regarding personnel. Of 
course it does: The Deputy Council President is elected by the Plenary from among the 
Presidents of Chambers. He thus is a member of the HSYK with no executive affiliation 
because the Undersecretary cannot be elected President of the First Chamber. The Minister of 
course is and remains a cabinet member even after he enters the door of the HSYK building 
and assumes his function as the ex officio President of the HSYK.  
 
5.4. Evaluation of the Law No. 6524 by the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court decided on 10 April that many parts of the Law No. 6524 violated 
the Constitution. The reasoned decision was published in the Official Gazette on 14 May 
2014, after my mission. 
The Constitutional Court struck down the following provisions pertaining to:  
- the power of the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK to 
appoint the President and Deputy Presidents of the Inspection Board (subject to the 
proviso that the annulment should enter into force only three months after the 
publication of the reasoned decision44); 
- the power of the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK to 
determine in which Chamber the members and substitute members of the HSYK are to 
serve (with immediate effect and accompanied by a stay of execution); 
- the requirement that when electing the Chamber Presidents, the Plenary is limited to 
two candidates proposed by the respective Chamber as well as the fall-back rule for 
cases of lack of quorum of the Plenary session in which the election was originally 
scheduled to take place45 (subject to the proviso that the annulment should enter into 
force only three months after the publication of the reasoned decision); 
- the fall-back rule for cases of lack of quorum of the Plenary session in which the 
election of the Secretary-General was originally scheduled to take place (subject to the 
proviso that the annulment should enter into force only three months after the 
publication of the reasoned decision); 
                                                 
44 According to the explanation I received that proviso was added to avoid a gap in the law. Decisions of the 
Constitutional Court which declare a law unconstitutional have no retroactive effect and thus do not revive the 
previous law that was superseded by the unconstitutional law. Since the dismissal of the entire personnel of the 
HSYK by virtue of unconstitutional Provisional Art. 4 remains effective, there must be a legal possibility to 
replace the staff. Otherwise the HSYK could not operate until the TGNA had passed a new law which is in 
accordance with the constitution. While in such cases the TGNA is usually given six months, the time period 
was shortened to three months in the particular case because of the urgency of the matter. 
45 That fall-back rule was struck down by the Constitutional Court because it did not clearly state what quorum 
was required in the next plenary session in which the election is actually conducted. 
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- the requirement that when appointing rapporteur judges the Plenary is limited to two 
candidates proposed by the First Chamber as well as the fall-back rule for cases of 
lack of quorum of the Plenary session in which the election was originally scheduled 
to take place (with immediate effect and accompanied by a stay of execution); 
- the responsibility of the President of the Inspection Board to the Minister in his 
capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK46 (subject to the proviso that the 
annulment should enter into force only three months after the publication of the 
reasoned decision); 
- the appointment of the President and Deputy Presidents of the Inspection Board by the 
Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK (subject to the proviso 
that the annulment should enter into force only three months after the publication of 
the reasoned decision); 
- the requirement that when appointing inspectors the Plenary is limited to two 
candidates proposed by the First Chamber as well as the fall-back rule for cases of 
lack of quorum of the Plenary session in which the election was originally scheduled 
to take place (with immediate effect and accompanied by a stay of execution); 
- the power of the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK to 
give duties to the President of the Inspection Board (subject to the proviso that the 
annulment should enter into force only three months after the publication of the 
reasoned decision); 
- the election of HSYK members by the civil and administrative judges and prosecutors 
according to a voting system different from that introduced for the election of HSYK 
members by the Court of Cassation, the Council of State and the Justice Academy, a 
differentiation which the Constitutional Court held to be incompatible with the 
principle of equality47 (subject to the proviso that the annulment should enter into 
force only three months after the publication of the reasoned decision);  
- the purely discretionary power of the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio 
President of the HSYK to summon an extraordinary meeting of the Plenary, even if 
the majority of the HSYK members request such a meeting (subject to the proviso that 
the annulment should enter into force only three months after the publication of the 
reasoned decision); 
- the power of the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK to 
launch investigations against elected HSYK members for disciplinary or criminal 
offences committed during their membership and disciplinary or criminal offences 
committed prior to their election to the HSYK as well as the power of the Minister to 
establish an investigation board of three members (subject to the proviso that the 
annulment should enter into force only three months after the publication of the 
reasoned decision); 
- the legislative dismissal of the entire personnel of the HSYK, their transfer to other 
positions and the appointment of new personnel; 
- the suspension for five years of the requirement of twenty years of service as judge or 
prosecutor before being eligible for membership in the HSYK (subject to the proviso 
that the annulment should enter into force only three months after the publication of 
the reasoned decision). 
The Constitutional Court accordingly eliminated most of the provisions of the Law No. 6524 
that had increased the powers of the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the 
                                                 
46 The Constitutional Court did not find fault with another provision according to which the Inspection Board 
performs its duties on behalf of the Council and under the supervision of the Council President (i.e. the Minister 
ex officio). 
47 See further below para. 5.5.5. 
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HSYK. This is certainly a positive aspect which demonstrates the resilience of the Turkish 
constitutional system. But the Court was indeed the last bulwark to stop the rollback of the 
reform of 2010 – the legislature had better never have gone that far, thus calling their 
adherence to the principle of judicial independence into question. More importantly, the Court 
did not (and could not) undo the accomplished facts caused by the entry into force of the Law 
(such as the dismissal of the entire HSYK staff) and even less the damaging long-term effects 
of the message which the legislative procedure sent to the HSYK and the judiciary as a whole. 
Also, several provisions have survived scrutiny by the Constitutional Court and therefore 
remain in force even though they are incompatible with European standards. These provisions 
add items to the unfinished reform agenda of 2010. 
 
5.5. The Remaining Parts of the Law No. 6524 which Survived Scrutiny by the 
Constitutional Court 
5.5.1. Approval Power of Minister in his Capacity as the ex officio President of the 
HSYK with regard to Examinations and Investigations against Judges and 
Prosecutors 
The provision which extended the approval power of the Minister in his capacity as the ex 
officio President of the HSYK concerning decisions of the Third Chamber on examinations 
and investigations against judges and prosecutors to negative decisions (i.e. decisions not to 
examine or investigate) is incompatible with the independence of the judiciary. I have 
continuously recommended the removal of the original provision which limited the 
Ministerial influence to a veto over positive decisions of the Third Chamber to launch 
examinations or investigations.48 I repeat my previous recommendations and extend them to 
the new Ministerial power. I do this irrespective of my recommendation above that the ex 
officio chairmanship of the Minister of Justice in the HSYK should be terminated49 because 
the approval power of the Minister does not necessarily depend on his chairmanship of the 
High Council. To the extent that the removal of the Ministerial influence on the initiation of 
examinations and investigations requires constitutional amendment, the constitution should be 
amended accordingly. 
Some of my interlocutors claimed that the negative and positive Ministerial control over the 
examinations and investigations introduced a beneficial or even necessary element of 
separation of powers into the system: The procedural decision was given to the Minister in his 
capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK and the substantive decision on the 
conclusions to be drawn from the results of that procedure was entrusted to the HSYK. That 
claim is unconvincing because the Ministerial control jeopardizes the independence of the 
judiciary. There already is a separation of powers element in the system because it is the Third 
Chamber of the HSYK that controls the procedure while the Second Chamber takes the 
substantive decisions. Moreover, in view of my recommendation to extend the judicial review 
to all the High Council decisions which potentially interfere with the independence or 
impartiality or individual rights of judges and public prosecutors,50 the power of the HSYK is 
limited sufficiently. 
I could not get any official information on the practical use of the Ministerial veto power 
either by the previous Minister or by the new Minister in their capacity as the ex officio 
Presidents of the HSYK. This was quite striking in view of the otherwise very detailed 
information I was given. 
                                                 
48 See my Reports of 1 August 2011 (para. 3.2.3.) and of 4 February 2013 (para. 2.5.3.3.). 
49 See above para. 4.3. 
50 See below para. 5.5.6. 
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I recommend that the requirement of approval by the Minister of Justice in his capacity 
as the ex officio President of the HSYK of the annual routine inspection schemes be 
abolished. 
I further recommend that the Ministerial veto on the initiation as well as non-initiation 
of disciplinary examinations and investigations concerning judges and public 
prosecutors be eliminated.  
Art. 159 (9) of the Constitution which can be interpreted as covering both the negative 
and the positive aspect of the Ministerial control should be changed accordingly. 
 
5.5.2. Power of Minister in his Capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK to 
Appoint the Deputy Secretaries-General 
Under the previous law, the Deputy Secretaries-General were appointed by the Plenary. The 
Law No. 6524 transferred that power to the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President 
of the HSYK and the Constitutional Court found that provision to be constitutional. One of 
the main goals of the 2010 reform was to make the HSYK independent of the Ministry with 
regard to its personnel. This has been partly rescinded by returning the power to appoint the 
Deputy Secretaries-General to the Minister. I can see no reason why the Minister should have 
such an influence on the selection of the HSYK personnel. It is certainly enough to let him 
select the Secretary-General from a group of three candidates nominated by the Plenary. 
Moreover, the division of labour between the Deputies which was previously determined by 
the Secretary-General alone is now subject to the approval by the Minister. There is no 
plausible reason for this reform which would be compatible with the principle of judicial 
independence. 
I recommend that the power to appoint the Deputy Secretaries-General be returned to 
the Plenary of the HSYK. I further recommend that the division of labour between the 
Deputy Secretaries-General be entirely left to the Secretary-General and that the 
Ministerial approval power be abolished. 
 
In their written comments, the Ministry of Justice argue that the paragraph above is 
contradictory because I have no objection against the power of the Minister in his capacity as 
the ex officio President of the HSYK to appoint the Secretary-General but criticize his power 
to appoint the Deputy Secretaries-General. I disagree with this argument for three reasons: 
First, the appointment power of the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the 
HSYK is strictly limited by the proposal power of the Plenary. Secondly, if this kind of 
limited executive influence on the High Council’s personnel is extended further to other 
personnel, it becomes more difficult to ensure the independent operation of the HSYK. 
Thirdly, one of the main goals of the 2010 reform was to establish the High Council’s 
autonomy with regard to its personnel, including the Deputy Secretaries-General, in order to 
safeguard the independence of the HSYK from the executive both in law and in appearance. 
Undoing that reform step sends the wrong signal: that the executive, in the person of the 
Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK, intends to resume control of 
the High Council’s personnel. 
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5.5.3. Power of Minister in his Capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK to 
Appoint HSYK Personnel 
The independence of the HSYK in regard of personnel which had been introduced by the 
2010 reform was guaranteed by giving the appointment power to the Deputy Council 
President who decided upon the proposal by the Secretary-General. The Law No. 6524 
transferred the appointment power to the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of 
the HSYK. Here as well, there is no plausible reason for the reform which would be 
compatible with the principle of judicial independence. 
I recommend that the power to appoint HSYK personnel be returned to the Deputy 
President and Secretary-General of the HSYK. 
 
5.5.4. Supervision of Minister in his Capacity as the ex officio President of the HSYK 
over Inspection Board 
While the Constitutional Court struck down the provision according to which the President of 
the Inspection Board was responsible to the Minister, it found constitutional a further 
provision setting forth that the Inspection Board performs its duties on behalf of the Council 
and under the supervision of the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the 
HSYK (whereas before the supervisory power had been accorded to the President of the Third 
Chamber). The latter provision raises doubts as to who ultimately controls the Board – the 
HSYK or the Minister. Ministerial control of the inspection system was abolished in 2010 
because it was considered to be incompatible with the independence of the judiciary. It should 
be placed beyond doubt that the Minister in his capacity as the ex officio President of the 
HSYK exercises no control over the Inspection Board and that only the HSYK has 
supervisory powers. Any other arrangement would give rise to wrong appearances and 
damage the credibility of the system. 
I recommend that the power to supervise the work of the Inspection Board be returned 
to the President of the Third Chamber of the HSYK.  
 
5.5.5. Election of HSYK Members 
The reintroduction of the “one man, one vote” system for the election of HSYK members 
from the Court of Cassation, the Council of State and the Justice Academy by Law No. 6524 
(but not for the election of HSYK members by the civil and administrative judges and 
prosecutors) is a commendable step in the right direction. As I wrote in my previous reports, 
such a system increases the likelihood that minority candidates are also elected, and thus of a 
more pluralistic composition of the High Council which better represents the Turkish 
judiciary as a whole.51 However, the Constitutional Court had on 7 July 2010 declared that 
system to be unconstitutional even though it had been introduced by constitutional 
amendment. This is why the legislature had then established a plural voting system (each 
elector having as many votes as vacant seats are to be filled).  
In its decision of 10 April 2014, the Constitutional Court reconsidered this issue and the 
Judges changed their mind, referring also to the Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe. Accordingly, they now upheld the reintroduction of the “one man, one vote” system 
for the election of HSYK members from the Court of Cassation, the Council of State and the 
Justice Academy. But the Constitutional Court understandably would not tolerate different 
                                                 
51 See my Report of 1 August 2011 (para. 3.2.2.1.) and my Report of 4 February 2013 (para. 2.3.1.). 
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voting systems for different electoral groups in the same elections which it qualified as a 
violation of the principle of equality. Since the Court underlined the discretion of the 
legislature in determining the voting system, it is now up to the TGNA either to extend the 
“one man, one vote” system also to the civil and administrative judges and prosecutors (which 
in my view is the preferable solution), or to maintain the previous plural voting system for all 
the electoral groups, or to come up with yet another system and apply it equally to all the 
electoral groups. 
I recommend that the “one man, one vote” be extended to the election of HSYK 
members by the civil and administrative judges and prosecutors. 
 
5.5.6. Remedies against HSYK Decisions 
The Law No. 6524 as enacted does not change the previous legal situation with regard to 
remedies against HSYK decisions.52 I criticized that situation in my Report of 4 February 
2013 both with respect to the absence of judicial remedies (except concerning dismissals from 
the profession) and the internal complaint procedure where the members of the Chamber that 
made the original decision participate in the Plenary when it decides on the complaint. This 
does not fully meet the impartiality standard of Art. 13 ECHR.53 Although the introduction of 
that internal complaint procedure was a step in the right direction, it does not go far enough. I 
repeat my recommendation realizing that it requires an amendment to Art. 159 (10) of the 
Constitution.  
I recommend that the judicial review should be extended to all the High Council 
decisions which potentially interfere with the independence or impartiality or individual 
rights of judges and public prosecutors. Actions brought by judges or public prosecutors 
against High Council decisions, no matter whether disciplinary or other, are admissible 
only if they can make an arguable claim that either the principles of independence and 
impartiality or their individual rights have been violated by the challenged decision. The 
prior exhaustion of an internal review mechanism can, however, be required, provided 
that the internal review board is truly impartial. To make necessary readjustments easy, 
the rules on judicial remedies should be included in the law and not the Constitution. 
 
5.5.7. Revocation of all HSYK Circulars 
Provisional Art. 4 revoked all the circulars issued by the HSYK, including an important one 
of 30 September 2011 that the result of an eventual review of judicial and prosecutorial 
decisions by the European Court of Human Rights would be taken into consideration when 
decisions on promotion are made. The Undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice told me that a 
similar circular has meanwhile been issued.54 This induces me to repeat recommendations 
which I made in this context in my Report of 4 February 2013.55 
I recommend that the promotion criterion of how decisions made by a certain judge or 
public prosecutor fared on appeal or in the European Court of Human Rights be 
implemented cautiously in a way which safeguards judicial and prosecutorial 
                                                 
52 The original legislative proposal had abolished the power of the Plenary to decide on complaints against 
Chamber decisions and introduced a system in which another Chamber was given that power. 
53 See European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 13 November 2008 in the case of Kayasu v. Turkey (Nos. 
64119/00 and 76292/01). 
54 As a matter of fact, in March 2014, an ‘Action Plan for the Prevention of Violations of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ was adopted. 
55 Para. 2.5.2.1. 
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independence. The mere fact of a reversal on appeal or a conviction in Strasbourg 
should not automatically be qualified as a negative factor with regard to promotion. 
Rather, the courage to question the case law of the high courts or the Strasbourg Court 
in a thoroughly reasoned opinion for the sake of initiating the progressive development 
of the law should be rated as a positive factor. If, however, the reversal on appeal or the 
conviction in Strasbourg occurred because the judicial or prosecutorial decision was 
based on the inexcusable ignorance or reckless disregard or arbitrary application of the 
duly published relevant case law, this can be qualified as bad performance for 
promotion purposes. 
I further recommend that the project of providing translations of the relevant decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights to the judges and public prosecutors be 
continued on a permanent basis. The European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Strasbourg case law should also be made a prominent and permanent feature of the pre-
service and in-service training of the Turkish Justice Academy. 
 
5.5.8. Outstanding Recommendations Concerning further Reform of the HSYK 
In my Reports of 1 August 2011 and of 4 February 2013 I made a number of further 
recommendations concerning future reform of the HSYK for the sake of improving the 
independence and impartiality of the Turkish judiciary. As those recommendations have not 
yet been taken up, I repeat them here in a partly revised version without going into any detail. 
I refer to the reasons I gave in my two previous reports. 
I recommend that 
- the Turkish Grand National Assembly be given an important role in the election of 
the non-judicial members of the HSYK, acting by a reinforced majority so as to 
ensure the election of impartial members; 
- part of the responsibility for recruiting the candidates for the position of judges and 
public prosecutors be transferred to the HSYK and the influence of the Ministry of 
Justice on the boards of interview be reduced;  
- with regard to disciplinary sanctions (including removal from office) all members of 
the judiciary should as far as possible be subject to the same rules. These rules should 
be implemented by the High Council, except for members of the Constitutional Court 
with regard to whom implementation should be entrusted to the Constitutional 
Court; 
- with regard to the election of members of the Court of Cassation and the Council of 
State, the eligibility criteria should be clearly defined and published, a system be 
devised to reduce the number of candidates to a manageable level before any vote is 
taken in the HSYK Plenary and an interview of the shortlisted candidates be 
introduced before that vote; 
- the election period of HSYK members be extended and the possibility of re-election 
abolished for the sake of better safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the 
HSYK. The election periods of members should be staggered in a way that ensures 
that no more than half of the membership is replaced at the same time; 
- at least two of the four members of the High Council who are now appointed by the 
President of the Republic should rather be elected by the Grand National Assembly 
in a way that promotes the representation of different cultural and political 
orientations of the Turkish society. 
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In their written comments on my Report of 30 July 2014, the Ministry of Justice took 
exception to the first of the preceding recommendations. They argue that the President of the 
Republic who is currently empowered to select the four non-judicial members of the HSYK 
on his own makes that selection impartially and thus ensures the cultural and political 
diversity of the HSYK. It is true that the President of the Republic is now directly elected by 
the people so that his democratic legitimacy equals that of the Grand National Assembly. It is 
also true that the President of the Republic cannot be a member of any political party and that 
he is obliged to exercise his functions in an impartial manner. On the other hand, dividing the 
appointment power between the President of the Republic and the Grand National Assembly 
would even better ensure the cultural and political diversity of the HSYK. 
 
6. The Enactment of Remedial Law No. 6545 in June 2014 
On 28 June 2014, the Law No. 6545 entered into force. It amended the Law No. 6087 on the 
HSYK in order to repair the violations of the Constitution as had been established by the 
Constitutional Court. While the legislature had been given three months’ time by the 
Constitutional Court it acted much more quickly. This is certainly positive. On the other hand, 
the Law No. 6545 restored the legal situation before the entry into force of the Law No. 6524 
only to the extent in which the Constitutional Court had found it to be unconstitutional. The 
legislature did not repair those parts of the Law No. 6524 which the Constitutional Court 
upheld under the standards of the Turkish Constitution but which nonetheless are 
incompatible with European standards.56 There was no attempt on the legislature’s part to 
make any further progress with regard to the independence and impartiality of judiciary.  
For example, the Constitutional Court objected to the different voting systems which the Law 
No. 6524 had introduced for the election of HSYK members by the Court of Cassation, the 
Council of State and the Justice Academy (one man, one vote system) on the one hand and the 
civil and administrative judges and prosecutors (plural vote system in which each voter can 
cast as many votes as vacancies are to be filled) on the other hand.57 As the “one man, one 
vote” system is better suited to ensure plurality in the composition of the HSYK and thus 
increase public confidence in the Council’s impartial decision-making, I recommended the 
extension of that system also to the civil and administrative judges and prosecutors. The 
legislature, however, unfortunately returned to the old plural vote system for all electoral 
groups. 
Apart from that, the dutiful execution of the Constitutional Court decision by the legislature 
alone could not undo the self-inflicted damage to the credibility of the political majority as 
regards their adherence to the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. There was no 
admission that the enactment of the Law No. 6524 had been a mistake. 
 
7. The Elections to the HSYK of September and October 2014 
On 12 October, the elections of the ten HSYK members from the civil and criminal courts (7 
members) and the administrative courts (3 members) were held. Eight of the successful 
candidates belong to the Unity in the Judiciary Platform (YBP) which included candidates 
with different political backgrounds. None of the candidates nominated by YARSAV or the 
Judges’ Union were elected.  
                                                 
56 See above para. 5.5. 
57 See above para. 5.4. 
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At the Brussels meeting of 7 November 2014 I posed the question whether the Government 
had tried to influence the outcome of the elections by supporting certain candidates or groups 
because I had heard reports that the YNB had been supported by the authorities. I was assured 
that no governmental interference in the elections had taken place. My interlocutors were also 
unaware of any official statement by the President of the Republic that he had a “Plan B” 
which could be activated if the results of the HSYK elections were unsatisfactory. In any 
event, the Government apparently did consider those elections as crucial in their struggle to 
prevent what they depict as an attempt by the Gülen Movement to assume control of the 
judiciary.58 
In the elections by the High Courts which had already been held in September, none of the 
YBP candidates was successful, but two candidates supported by YARSAV were elected. 
Meanwhile, the Justice Academy has also elected one HSYK member and the President of the 
Republic has appointed four lawyers in private practice as non-judicial members.  
 
8. The Way Ahead toward Implementing European Standards of Judicial 
Independence, Impartiality and the Rule of Law 
My present peer review mission took place under difficult conditions because of the events I 
described earlier. While I experienced the same warm hospitality as always, I felt that some of 
my interlocutors were less ready to speak their mind than on previous missions. My 
impression is confirmed by the speech which the President of the Constitutional Court Haşim 
Kılıç gave at the ceremony marking the 52nd anniversary of the founding of the Court on 25 
April 2014. In the presence of both the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and 
several Ministers, President Kılıç found it necessary to reject interferences by the Government 
in the judiciary and underlined that a judiciary under Governmental tutelage which was used 
as a weapon against political opponents could never function as an independent protector of 
legal rights. The President of the Constitutional Court was thereupon criticised by Cabinet 
Ministers as being a partisan of an anti-government alliance. This raises the question whether 
there is consensus on fundamental constitutional and European values in Turkey today. 
The Government has publicly questioned the integrity of the Turkish judiciary as a whole and 
thereby undermined the credibility of the third branch of government as faithful guardians of 
the law in the eyes of the Turkish public. A general suspicion of conspiracy has been voiced 
in the sense that judges and public prosecutors who proceeded against the Government in 
high-profile cases followed orders by organisations outside the formal judicial structure.59 
However, European standards provide only one way to counteract alleged violations of their 
official duties by individual members of the judiciary – the ordinary disciplinary and criminal 
procedures in accordance with the law and in compliance with due process requirements. 
Apart from that, it is the core function of an independent and impartial judiciary in a system 
founded on the rule of law60 to say what the law is and to enforce the law with equal 
determination against everyone subject to the law– private individuals, enterprises, 
intelligence service chiefs, cabinet members or the Government as such, including in high-
profile cases. 
                                                 
58 See the exclusive interview given by the Minister of Justice in Daily Sabah, 25 November 2014 (available at 
http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/11/09/gulen-movement-did-not-manage-to-seize-judiciary-in-hsyk-
elections [last accessed on 29 November 2014]). 
59 This refers to the Gülen Movement. See above para. 5.1. 
60 See Art. 2 and Art. 49 (1) sentence 1 of the Treaty on European Union, Art. 3 of the Statute of the Council of 
Europe and the last preambular paragraph of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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I recommend that alleged violations of their official duties by individual members of the 
judiciary be sanctioned exclusively through the ordinary disciplinary and criminal 
procedures in accordance with the law and in compliance with due process 
requirements. It is against European standards for the political branches of government 
publicly to undermine the credibility of the judiciary as a whole by putting its members 
under a general suspicion of conspiracy (“coup attempt”).  
 
The course toward implementing European standards of judicial independence and 
impartiality was most clearly documented in the judicial reform of 2010. Less than four years 
later, the Law No. 6524 tried to undo important parts of that reform by bringing the HSYK as 
well as the Justice Academy under the control of the executive. The most problematic parts of 
that law were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and the Law No. 6545 
was quickly enacted in order to repair those violations of the Constitution, in dutiful execution 
of the Constitutional Court decision. But no further steps have so far been taken to repair the 
credibility of the governing majority as regards their adherence to the principles of judicial 
independence and impartiality in all cases, including high-profile cases. Such steps would be 
very important and necessary, since judicial independence and impartiality are the 
indispensable conditions of effectively securing the rule of law. These are fundamental 
European values upheld by both the Council of Europe, to which Turkey acceded in 1950, and 
the European Union, to which Turkey plans to accede. Art. 49 (1) of the Treaty on European 
Union requires candidate countries not only to respect the rule of law and its foundations, the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary, but also to be committed to promoting them. 
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Annex: Documents on Common European Standards of Independence and Impartiality 
of the Judiciary 
 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on 
judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities 
Venice Commission Report on the independence of the judicial system (2010) - Part I: the 
independence of judges, Part II: the prosecution service 
European Guidelines on Ethics and conduct for public prosecutors (the Budapest guidelines) 
adopted by the Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe on 31 May 2005 
Consultative Council of European Judges Opinion No 1 (2001) on standards concerning the 
independence of the judiciary and the irremovability of judges 
Council of Europe recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the Role of Public Prosecution in the 
Criminal System 
Council of Europe recommendation CM/Rec(2012)11 of the Committee of Ministers to 
member States on the role of public prosecutors outside the criminal justice system 
European Charter on the statute for judges, 1998 
Committee of Ministers Recommendation R(94) 12 on the independence, efficiency and role 
of judge, 1994 
Recommendation No R (86) of the Council of Europe on Measures to Prevent and Reduce the 
Excessive Workload in Courts 
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (“Bangalore Principles”), adopted by the UN 
Human Rights Commission on 23 April 2003 
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 
August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 
November 1985 and 40/146 of 113 December 1985 
 
